lgpd-dsar
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of data from various user channels to update profiles or execute erasure requests, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if an AI agent is utilized to interpret or automate these requests.
- Ingestion points: Request payloads in the
/api/me/profileand/api/me/erasureendpoints, as well as natural language requests from informal channels (WhatsApp, social media) described in the operational workflow. - Boundary markers: The implementation relies on standard API request boundaries; no explicit LLM delimiters or 'ignore' instructions are present in the provided data-processing templates.
- Capability inventory: Modifies user records in the database, revokes authentication sessions, and triggers data propagation to external service operators.
- Sanitization: The code implements robust sanitization by whitelisting specific fields (
EDITABLE_FIELDS) and enforcing type checks, which effectively limits the impact of malicious inputs. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes an automated mechanism to propagate data changes to third-party services like Stripe, Mixpanel, and Customer.io. These are documented as necessary steps for regulatory compliance (LGPD Art. 18, § 6º) and target well-known, trusted service providers.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Security-sensitive values, including the HMAC key used for anonymizing backup data, are correctly accessed via environment variables (
process.env.BACKUP_SUPPRESSION_KEY_B64) rather than being hardcoded in the scripts.
Audit Metadata