bio-atac-seq-nucleosome-positioning

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external bioinformatics data files, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection if those files contain malicious instructions or unexpected metadata strings.
  • Ingestion points: sample.bam, regions.bed, genome.fa, and genes.bed are utilized as data inputs in the provided Bash, Python, and R code examples.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to the agent to disregard potential instructions embedded within the metadata or content of the genomic files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill directs the execution of CLI tools like nucleoatac, danpos.py, and bedtools, and utilizes Python/R libraries for deep file parsing.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not provide methods for sanitizing the input data before processing.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires downloading and installing research software from external GitHub repositories.
  • Evidence: Instructions include cloning scPrinter from github.com/buenrostrolab/scPrinter and using DANPOS3 from github.com/sklasfeld/DANPOS3.
  • Note: These are reputable academic sources within the field of genomics, but the pattern of cloning and execution represents a potential supply chain risk if the repositories were compromised.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of various local shell commands for scientific computation.
  • Commands include nucleoatac run, bedtools slop, and python danpos.py dpos.
  • This is expected behavior for bioinformatic analysis but grants the agent direct access to the shell and file system.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 12:04 PM