bio-atac-seq-nucleosome-positioning
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external bioinformatics data files, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection if those files contain malicious instructions or unexpected metadata strings.
- Ingestion points:
sample.bam,regions.bed,genome.fa, andgenes.bedare utilized as data inputs in the provided Bash, Python, and R code examples. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to the agent to disregard potential instructions embedded within the metadata or content of the genomic files.
- Capability inventory: The skill directs the execution of CLI tools like
nucleoatac,danpos.py, andbedtools, and utilizes Python/R libraries for deep file parsing. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not provide methods for sanitizing the input data before processing.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires downloading and installing research software from external GitHub repositories.
- Evidence: Instructions include cloning
scPrinterfromgithub.com/buenrostrolab/scPrinterand usingDANPOS3fromgithub.com/sklasfeld/DANPOS3. - Note: These are reputable academic sources within the field of genomics, but the pattern of cloning and execution represents a potential supply chain risk if the repositories were compromised.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of various local shell commands for scientific computation.
- Commands include
nucleoatac run,bedtools slop, andpython danpos.py dpos. - This is expected behavior for bioinformatic analysis but grants the agent direct access to the shell and file system.
Audit Metadata