bio-single-cell-splicing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
examples/sc_splicing_brie2.pyusessubprocess.runto execute external bioinformatics CLI tools such asbriekit-event,brie-count, andbrie-quant. - Evidence: The skill defines Python functions that pass file paths directly to
subprocess.runto invoke command-line utilities. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to install several specialized packages directly from GitHub repositories rather than standard package registries.
- Evidence:
usage-guide.mdincludes commands forpip install git+https://github.com/songlab-cal/scquint,SpliZ, andpsix, as well as R-based GitHub installations forMARVELandSierra. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external data files (BAM, GTF, TSV) which could potentially contain malformed data or embedded instructions designed to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points:
examples/sc_splicing_brie2.pyreads genomic BAM, GTF, and barcode files. - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided code to separate untrusted data from processing logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands and perform file system operations.
- Sanitization: No explicit validation or sanitization of the contents of external genomic files is performed before they are passed to analytical tools.
Audit Metadata