game-ui-sprite-sheet-splitter

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 21, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a shell command python3 scripts/split_sprite_sheet.py with multiple parameters derived from dynamic variables such as <source.png>, <output-dir>, and <pack-id>. The direct interpolation of these variables into a shell string without explicit sanitization or quoting poses a risk of command injection if the inputs are influenced by untrusted data.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill depends on a Python script at scripts/split_sprite_sheet.py. This script is not provided in the analyzed file set, and its execution constitutes a reliance on unverified code logic.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of external assets and configuration files.
  • Ingestion points: Reads data from contracts/style-contract.yaml, contracts/component-contract.yaml, mappings/*.yaml, and user-provided image files in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are provided to prevent the agent from following malicious instructions potentially embedded in these data sources.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can perform file system writes, zip archive creation, and shell command execution via python3.
  • Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing or validating the content of the ingested YAML files or the metadata extracted from images.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill creates a ZIP archive at <project>/packages/<pack-id>-png.zip. This mechanism could potentially be manipulated to include sensitive project files in the archive if path variables or file selectors are not strictly validated.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 21, 2026, 03:11 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — game-ui-sprite-sheet-splitter