skills/guiguiyan930-source/game-ui-design-workflow/game-ui-sprite-sheet-splitter/Gen Agent Trust Hub
game-ui-sprite-sheet-splitter
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a shell command
python3 scripts/split_sprite_sheet.pywith multiple parameters derived from dynamic variables such as<source.png>,<output-dir>, and<pack-id>. The direct interpolation of these variables into a shell string without explicit sanitization or quoting poses a risk of command injection if the inputs are influenced by untrusted data. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill depends on a Python script at
scripts/split_sprite_sheet.py. This script is not provided in the analyzed file set, and its execution constitutes a reliance on unverified code logic. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of external assets and configuration files.
- Ingestion points: Reads data from
contracts/style-contract.yaml,contracts/component-contract.yaml,mappings/*.yaml, and user-provided image files inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are provided to prevent the agent from following malicious instructions potentially embedded in these data sources.
- Capability inventory: The agent can perform file system writes, zip archive creation, and shell command execution via
python3. - Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing or validating the content of the ingested YAML files or the metadata extracted from images.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill creates a ZIP archive at
<project>/packages/<pack-id>-png.zip. This mechanism could potentially be manipulated to include sensitive project files in the archive if path variables or file selectors are not strictly validated.
Audit Metadata