land
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external tools and local files to automate workflow steps, creating a surface for indirect instructions to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads output from
wt inspect,git status,git log, andgh pr view(SKILL.md), as well as local retrospective and observation files likewait-observations.jsonl(references/retrospect.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to treat ingested content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute
gitandghcommands, performevalfor session management, and write to the local filesystem. - Sanitization: Absent. Content from the codebase and GitHub is interpolated directly into messages and shell commands.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes techniques that execute code or binaries determined at runtime.
- Evidence: The command
eval "$(wt session set coord-<work-slug>)"executes the output of thewtutility directly in the shell context. - Evidence: The instruction to run
./target/debug/wt --versionexecutes a binary from a build directory, which is a form of dynamic local execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies heavily on shell-based interactions to manage the repository lifecycle.
- Evidence: Multiple instances of
git(merge, fetch, switch, cherry-pick),gh(api, pr view), andwt(inspect, workflow pass, done) commands are used to manipulate state and communicate between agents.
Audit Metadata