research-literature-radar
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted external data, including paper titles, abstracts, and community signals from academic databases and social platforms, which could contain malicious prompts meant to influence the agent's evaluation logic.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the skill's context via the
research-literature-searchsub-skill and supplementary signals from URLs (e.g., Hugging Face, X, and researcher blogs) as specified inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat ingested paper metadata as non-executable text or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to write to the local filesystem (creating directories in
papers/and.bensz-api/) and execute shell commands (specificallygh api) as described inSKILL.mdand performed by scripts likescripts/reconcile_integrity.py. - Sanitization: While
scripts/catalog.pyperforms title normalization for ID generation, the full metadata content is archived without significant sanitization. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdauthorize the use of thegh apicommand-line tool for uploading bug reports. - Evidence: The skill specifies that bug reports are first recorded to
~/.bensz-skills/bugs/and only uploaded to GitHub usinggh apiif the user explicitly requests it. This represents a controlled interaction with a well-known service (GitHub) for diagnostic purposes.
Audit Metadata