ia-reflect
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill scans the full conversation history (Step 1), which consists of untrusted data, to identify improvements and capture learnings.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
remember:hook (Step 6) instructs the agent to save content directly to persistent memory files without interpretation. This bypasses typical instruction-data separation and can be exploited via indirect prompt injection if an attacker places the marker in a context read by the agent. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface:
- Ingestion points: Reads full conversation transcript (SKILL.md, Step 1).
- Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not specify the use of delimiters to isolate the analyzed transcript data.
- Capability inventory: File-write to
~/.claude/projects/(Step 4, 6), file-read viagrep(Step 4), and the ability to modify other skill files through diff applications (Step 5). - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the ingested conversation content before it is used for memory persistence or skill refactoring.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive filesystem paths at
~/.claude/projects/to manage persistent agent state and project-specific memory. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
SPEC.mdfile contains shell commands for validation and testing (e.g.,python3 distillery/scripts/distiller.py) which could be abused if the agent is manipulated into executing them.
Audit Metadata