lead-pages
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes an automated pipeline that processes external data from Aitable and lead capture forms, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the system through
Aitable Clientsrow updates and thePOST /api/leads/landing-pageendpoint. - Boundary markers: The skill mentions phone number validation and rate limiting, but does not specify explicit boundary markers to isolate instructions within the generated strategies or landing page content.
- Capability inventory: The system uses an
lp-builder workerwhich involvesStitch MCP scaffoldandClaude Code wire, suggesting the generation of code or configuration based on input data. - Sanitization: Basic phone number validation and deduplication are implemented, but broader content sanitization for the strategy doc generation is not detailed.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The architecture describes a dynamic build process where an
lp-builder workerutilizesStitch MCP scaffoldandClaude Code wire. This pattern indicates the runtime assembly and potential execution of code scaffolding or configurations during the landing page generation phase. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill contains a hardcoded Cloudflare R2 bucket identifier (
pub-f1692e774ca04e3b9e495f7d3c85a759.r2.dev) within the anti-patterns section. While listed as a negative example to prevent developers from hardcoding such strings, it exposes an internal infrastructure identifier.
Audit Metadata