engagement-workflow
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands by interpolating unvalidated user inputs directly into string templates executed via the
Bashtool. - Evidence: Subcommands like
/digital-marketing-pro:engagement startandadd-stone-factuse variables such as{brand-slug},{engagement-id}, and{fact-json}inside shell command strings (e.g.,python ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/engagement-state.py init --brand {brand-slug}). - Risk: Maliciously crafted inputs containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,
;,$(...), or`) or single quotes could break out of the intended command structure to execute arbitrary code on the host machine. - [UNVERIFIABLE_DEPENDENCIES_AND_REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's core logic and persistence are delegated to an external script,
engagement-state.py, which is not part of the analyzed skill definition. - Evidence: All primary subcommands rely on executing
python ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/engagement-state.py. - Risk: This creates a dependency on an external executable that operates with the agent's full system permissions, making the security of the skill entirely dependent on the unverified contents of that script.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The workflow ingests and processes untrusted data from the 'Client Validation Document' (Part 5) to influence the behavior of the 'Decision Matrix' and downstream content generation.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdprocesses findings withACCEPT/REJECT/EDIT/DEFERoptions provided by users or external clients. - Capability inventory: The skill has
Bash,Write, andEditpermissions, and triggers further production skills likefour-core-documentsbased on this input. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or boundary markers to prevent instructions embedded within the client feedback from overriding the agent's logic during the v2 re-run phase.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and manages sensitive application data in the user's home directory.
- Evidence: Accesses
~/.claude-marketing/brands/{brand-slug}/profile.jsonand manages state in_engagement.json. - Risk: While consistent with the skill's stated purpose, the pattern of reading structured data from the home directory and passing it to a script via command-line arguments increases the surface area for potential data leakage or manipulation.
Audit Metadata