growth-engineering
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external brand profiles and guideline files which could serve as a vector for indirect instructions.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads from
~/.claude-marketing/brands/{slug}/profile.jsonand~/.claude-marketing/brands/{slug}/guidelines/_manifest.jsonas specified inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to disregard potential AI instructions embedded within these JSON or markdown files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities for file system access (read) and local command execution via Python scripts.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the data content is described before it is used in the prompt context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local Python scripts to manage campaign and benchmark data.
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to runpython "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/campaign-tracker.py" --brand {slug} --action list-campaignsto retrieve history.affiliate-marketing.mdreferences a requirement to usepython scripts/benchmark_book.py --action record ... --source <url>to maintain updated market figures.- The use of the
{slug}parameter in a shell command represents a surface for potential argument injection if the brand identifier is not properly validated.
Audit Metadata