sop-library
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a shell command
python "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/execution-tracker.py" --brand {slug} --action get-historywhere{slug}is a user-provided variable. Without explicit sanitization, this allows for command injection if the user provides shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&,|). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: File paths are constructed using user-controlled variables
{category}and{sop-slug}(e.g.,~/.claude-marketing/sops/{category}/{sop-slug}.json). This pattern is vulnerable to path traversal attacks, potentially allowing the agent to read from or write to arbitrary locations on the filesystem if input like../../is used. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data and provides a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from brand profile files (
profile.json), execution history logs retrieved via a script, and direct user input for SOP content and overrides. - Boundary markers: None identified. There are no instructions to the agent to treat external content as data only or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the local filesystem (
~/.claude-marketing/sops/) and execute subprocesses (viaexecution-tracker.py). - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation logic is specified for the interpolated content or brand/SOP identifiers.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata