parallel-agent-orchestration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill framework defines methods for ingesting and processing external, potentially untrusted data that is subsequently passed to parallel subagents for execution. \n
- Ingestion points: Data enters the workflow through the
TaskDecomposer.decomposemethod (via thetaskandcontextarguments) and is dispatched for execution in theParallelOrchestrator.run_subtaskmethod. \n - Boundary markers: The provided code snippets do not implement boundary markers or specific instructions to ensure that subagents ignore any malicious commands embedded within the task descriptions or context data. \n
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator triggers subagent execution via
agent.execute, which, depending on the environment, could lead to unauthorized tool use or file system access if the subagent is influenced by injected data. \n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or sanitization applied to the task context or descriptions before they are passed to the subagent factory.
Audit Metadata