interface-review

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted content from Pull Request metadata and repository history, which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Pull request titles and bodies fetched via gh pr view, commit messages, and source code content accessed through git show and git diff (SKILL.md, Section 6 and scope-resolution.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or specific "ignore" blocks to isolate untrusted PR metadata from the agent's execution context.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell commands (git, gh, grep), performs network fetches from GitHub, and can create temporary directories (git worktree add).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of external text before it is processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates and executes a variety of shell commands to inspect the repository state and resolve change scopes.
  • Evidence: Use of git diff, git blame, git show, git grep, git worktree, and gh CLI commands across SKILL.md and scope-resolution.md to analyze the codebase.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to fetch code and metadata from GitHub. These operations target a well-known and trusted service.
  • Evidence: git fetch origin "pull/<n>/head:..." and gh pr view are used to retrieve remote content for analysis (scope-resolution.md).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 20, 2026, 12:00 AM