interview-transcription
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
subprocess.runto call external command-line tools such aswhisperxandffmpeginSKILL.md. These calls include user-provided file paths and configuration parameters. Although the script uses list-based argument passing to mitigate shell injection, it executes system-level commands based on external input. The code also facilitates passing a sensitive Hugging Face token as a command-line argument, which may be visible in process listings on some systems. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external, untrusted data which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Processes audio/video files via
audio_pathandvideo_pathand handles transcript text in theQuoteBankclass (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content embedded in transcripts or file metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file system access (
open,Path.mkdir,Path.glob) and command execution capabilities (subprocess.run) (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: Employs
re.escapefor timestamp-based regex search but lacks validation or sanitization for input paths and transcript content before further processing or command execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill refers to external resources including the
whisperxGitHub repository (m-bain/whisperX) and fetches models from Hugging Face (huggingface.co), a well-known service, to perform diarization tasks.
Audit Metadata