using-git-worktrees
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted repository files, presenting an indirect prompt injection and execution surface if the target workspace is malicious.
- Ingestion points: Evaluates local workspace configuration files including
CLAUDE.md,package.json,Cargo.toml,requirements.txt,pyproject.toml, andgo.modinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Present. Explicitly includes an untrusted content boundary definition specifying the use of
<EXTERNAL_DATA>delimiters inSKILL.md. - Capability inventory: Triggers execution of package management tools and test runners (
npm install,cargo build,pip install,poetry install,go mod download,npm test,cargo test,pytest,go test) inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: Absent. Relies on the user or calling agent to ensure the workspace repository itself is trusted before invoking automated installation and testing routines.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple system commands to set up the development environment.
- Evidence: Invokes commands such as
git worktree add,git check-ignore, and various package manager setup/test suites inSKILL.md. These actions are well-aligned with the primary utility purpose of the skill.
Audit Metadata