visual-explainer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches essential visualization libraries (Mermaid, Chart.js, anime.js) and fonts from well-known and trusted services including jsDelivr and Google Fonts. These are standard dependencies for zero-build frontend projects and do not involve untrusted or suspicious sources.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
open(macOS) andxdg-open(Linux) commands to launch generated HTML explainers in the browser. This is the intended primary delivery mechanism for the skill's functionality and does not involve privileged or dangerous system modifications. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data (user queries, repository code, and git history) to populate its diagrams, representing an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Data enters through
$ARGUMENTSin the diagram generation prompts and viagitcommand outputs in thediff-review,fact-check, andproject-recapprompts. - Boundary markers: The templates use semantic HTML sections, but there are no specific instructions to escape or sanitize user-supplied strings within the HTML structure.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write files to the
~/.agent/diagrams/directory and execute the browser opening command. - Sanitization: Explicit sanitization of user-provided content is absent from the prompt instructions, which is a known architectural surface for potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) if the processed codebase or user input contains malicious script tags. This is documented here as a best-practice observation rather than a malicious detection.
Audit Metadata