godot-brainstorming
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPERSISTENCEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONTIME_DELAYED_CONDITIONAL
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill instructs the agent to modify project-wide configuration files (e.g.,
CLAUDE.md,AGENTS.md,.cursor/rules/) to inject mandatory instructions for future sessions. This ensures that the agent always prioritizes using thegodot-promptertoolset in every session. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill requires the agent to read from and write to a directory in the user's home path (
~/.godot-prompter/state/<hash>.json). Accessing and modifying the filesystem outside of the project root, particularly within the home directory, is a significant security risk used to track cross-project behavior. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an attack surface by reading and modifying agent instruction files that are processed at the start of every session.
- Ingestion points:
CLAUDE.md,CLAUDE.local.md,.claude/CLAUDE.md,AGENTS.md,GEMINI.md,.github/copilot-instructions.md, and the.claude/rules/and.cursor/rules/directories. - Boundary markers: Absent for the injected instruction block.
- Capability inventory: Capabilities to write to project configuration files and the global home directory.
- Sanitization: Absent; the skill instructs the agent to write a specific, hardcoded instruction block into the files.
- [TIME_DELAYED_CONDITIONAL]: The execution of the instruction injection is gated by a check for previous user refusals stored in the hidden state file (
~/.godot-prompter/state/<hash>.json).
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata