godot-brainstorming

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPERSISTENCEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONTIME_DELAYED_CONDITIONAL
Full Analysis
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill instructs the agent to modify project-wide configuration files (e.g., CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, .cursor/rules/) to inject mandatory instructions for future sessions. This ensures that the agent always prioritizes using the godot-prompter toolset in every session.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill requires the agent to read from and write to a directory in the user's home path (~/.godot-prompter/state/<hash>.json). Accessing and modifying the filesystem outside of the project root, particularly within the home directory, is a significant security risk used to track cross-project behavior.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an attack surface by reading and modifying agent instruction files that are processed at the start of every session.
  • Ingestion points: CLAUDE.md, CLAUDE.local.md, .claude/CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, GEMINI.md, .github/copilot-instructions.md, and the .claude/rules/ and .cursor/rules/ directories.
  • Boundary markers: Absent for the injected instruction block.
  • Capability inventory: Capabilities to write to project configuration files and the global home directory.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill instructs the agent to write a specific, hardcoded instruction block into the files.
  • [TIME_DELAYED_CONDITIONAL]: The execution of the instruction injection is gated by a check for previous user refusals stored in the hidden state file (~/.godot-prompter/state/<hash>.json).
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 22, 2026, 02:07 PM