executive-digest
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several CLI tools (
gog,mcporter,todoist-cli) via shell commands to interact with external APIs. These tools are used for their intended purpose of fetching business data (emails, calendar events, tasks). - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses local configuration files, specifically
~/executive-assistant-skills/config/user.jsonand~/.env. These files are used to store and retrieve personal configuration and API tokens required for the skill's operations. This follows standard secret management practices for such integrations. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes content from untrusted external sources, including email threads and meeting notes via Granola. While this presents a surface for indirect prompt injection (where malicious instructions could be embedded in an email), the risk is mitigated as the skill's primary function is to summarize this data for the user rather than using it to drive further automated actions. Evidence:
- Ingestion points: Gmail thread content via
gogand meeting action items viamcporter(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the instructions to separate external content from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has
BashandWritecapabilities (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering is described for the content extracted from emails or meeting notes.
Audit Metadata