skill-adapter
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection. It is explicitly designed to read and adopt instructions, methodologies, and patterns from external files found in the
plugins/directory tree (including community-contributed plugins). - Ingestion points: The skill reads
commands/*.md,agents/*.md,skills/*/SKILL.md, andscripts/*.sh/*.pyfromplugins/community/,plugins/packages/, andplugins/examples/(identified inSKILL.mdandreferences/how-it-works.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded malicious content are present in the skill's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash(cmd:*),Read,Grep, andGlobtools. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of the content extracted from external plugins before it is used to influence agent behavior.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill configuration allows broad shell access via
Bash(cmd:*). While intended for plugin discovery and execution of 'synthesized' patterns, this could lead to arbitrary command execution if the learned patterns from external files are malicious.
Audit Metadata