brightdata-sdk-patterns
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides patterns for parsing HTML from external websites, which serves as an ingestion point for untrusted data into the agent's context.
- Ingestion points: The
parseProductPage(html)andparseSearchResults(html)functions inSKILL.mdaccept arbitrary HTML content from external sources. - Boundary markers: Absent; the parsed content is returned directly as structured objects without delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill is configured with
Read,Write, andEdittools, allowing the agent to perform file system operations based on the data it parses from untrusted sources. - Sanitization: Absent; the HTML is parsed using
cheeriobut the resulting text is not sanitized to remove or escape potential prompt injection attempts. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The TypeScript proxy client implementation in
SKILL.mdexplicitly disables SSL/TLS certificate validation, which is a significant security misconfiguration. - Evidence: The code snippet for
getBrightDataClientincludeshttpsAgent: new https.Agent({ rejectUnauthorized: false }). - Impact: This configuration makes all proxy traffic vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks, allowing attackers to intercept or modify the scraped data despite the use of HTTPS.
Audit Metadata