building-automl-pipelines
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and process external datasets for AutoML training, which introduces a potential surface for indirect prompt injection. An attacker could provide a malicious dataset containing instructions intended to be executed or interpreted by the agent during the data preparation or model training phases.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdinstructions (steps 6 and 7) describe loading training data and performing quality assessments using theReadtool. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined in the skill to treat the processed data as untrusted or to isolate it from the agent's logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities that could be misused if an injection succeeds, including
Bash(python:*)permissions and ascripts/pipeline_deployment.pyutility for recursive file operations. - Sanitization: While a data validation script (
data_validation.py) is mentioned in thescripts/README.mdas a means to prevent errors, its source code was not included in the analyzed files, leaving the actual implementation of data sanitization unverified.
Audit Metadata