clay-advanced-troubleshooting
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script
advanced-clay-debug.shlocated inreferences/implementation-guide.mdautomates the collection of sensitive system data into a single archive. This includes: - Execution of
kubectl get secret clay-secrets -o yaml, which retrieves raw, base64-encoded secrets from the environment. - Full system log collection via
journalctland container logs viakubectl logs. - Capturing raw network traffic using
tcpdumpon port 443. - While the script labels the secret file as 'redacted', the command itself performs no redaction, creating a high risk of credential exposure if the resulting bundle is shared.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process potentially untrusted data from external data providers and Clay enrichment tables, which represents an indirect injection surface.
- Ingestion points: External provider responses and Clay table row data are processed in
SKILL.md(Step 2 and Step 3) to diagnose failures. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimitation or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the data being analyzed.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Bash(curl:*)andBash(node:*)along withReadandGrep, providing a functional path for exfiltration or code execution if malicious instructions are processed. - Sanitization: There is no automated sanitization of the input data; although a manual redaction step is suggested for the final output, the internal processing of raw data remains vulnerable.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata