clay-advanced-troubleshooting

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script advanced-clay-debug.sh located in references/implementation-guide.md automates the collection of sensitive system data into a single archive. This includes:
  • Execution of kubectl get secret clay-secrets -o yaml, which retrieves raw, base64-encoded secrets from the environment.
  • Full system log collection via journalctl and container logs via kubectl logs.
  • Capturing raw network traffic using tcpdump on port 443.
  • While the script labels the secret file as 'redacted', the command itself performs no redaction, creating a high risk of credential exposure if the resulting bundle is shared.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process potentially untrusted data from external data providers and Clay enrichment tables, which represents an indirect injection surface.
  • Ingestion points: External provider responses and Clay table row data are processed in SKILL.md (Step 2 and Step 3) to diagnose failures.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimitation or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the data being analyzed.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes Bash(curl:*) and Bash(node:*) along with Read and Grep, providing a functional path for exfiltration or code execution if malicious instructions are processed.
  • Sanitization: There is no automated sanitization of the input data; although a manual redaction step is suggested for the final output, the internal processing of raw data remains vulnerable.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 9, 2026, 03:45 AM