clay-debug-bundle
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill uses shell command placeholders to retrieve the versions of Node.js and Python installed on the system at the time the skill is loaded.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and instructs the execution of a Bash script that collects system information (uname), tests network connectivity using curl, and reads local files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Accesses potentially sensitive local resources, including application logs (
logs/*.log) and environment configuration files (.env). The skill implements a basic redaction mechanism (usingsed) to hide secret values in the.envfile before including them in the diagnostic bundle. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Performs network requests to Clay's official API (
api.clay.com) to verify API key validity and to a user-provided webhook URL to test integration connectivity. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the log files it processes.
- Ingestion points: Application logs located at
logs/*.logand/tmp/clay-*.log. - Boundary markers: None; the skill reads and pipes log content directly into a text file using
grepandtail. - Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bash(includingcurlandtar),Read, andGreptools. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the log content to remove potential instructions hidden within log entries.
Audit Metadata