clickhouse-common-errors
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from database logs and system introspection tables, which serves as a vector for indirect prompt injection. A malicious actor who can write to database logs or influence system table content (e.g., through query comments) could embed instructions aimed at redirecting the agent's behavior during the diagnostic process.
- Ingestion points: The skill instructs the agent to capture exception strings from client returns, use
Grepto extract lines from log files, and querysystem.*tables (likesystem.query_logandsystem.processes). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when processing the captured log data or query results.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Bash(curl:*)for interacting with the ClickHouse HTTP interface and provides various SQL commands for execution, includingALTER TABLE,SETconfiguration, andKILL QUERYoperations. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization, validation, or escaping of the external data before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata