coderabbit-ci-integration

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides workflow templates that process untrusted data from pull requests, which could be leveraged by an attacker to influence automation outcomes.
  • Ingestion points: Workflow steps in SKILL.md read content from github.event.pull_request.title (Step 5), github.event.review.user.login (Step 3), and code diffs (Step 4).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or instructions for the agent/automation to ignore malicious instructions embedded within the pull request metadata or code.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is designed to write workflow files, execute gh api calls to modify repository protection settings (Step 6), and perform network notifications via Slack webhooks (Step 5).
  • Sanitization: PR titles and review states are interpolated directly into Slack notification payloads without explicit escaping or validation steps.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references several external GitHub Actions for CI/CD automation.
  • The workflow examples include actions/checkout@v4, actions/github-script@v7, and slackapi/slack-github-action@v1.27.1, all of which originate from well-known and reputable organizations.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes instructions to programmatically alter repository security configurations.
  • Step 6 provides a shell script that uses the GitHub CLI (gh api) to update branch protection rules, requiring specific status checks and enabling administrator enforcement.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 12, 2026, 08:22 PM