coderabbit-ci-integration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides workflow templates that process untrusted data from pull requests, which could be leveraged by an attacker to influence automation outcomes.
- Ingestion points: Workflow steps in
SKILL.mdread content fromgithub.event.pull_request.title(Step 5),github.event.review.user.login(Step 3), and code diffs (Step 4). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or instructions for the agent/automation to ignore malicious instructions embedded within the pull request metadata or code.
- Capability inventory: The skill is designed to write workflow files, execute
gh apicalls to modify repository protection settings (Step 6), and perform network notifications via Slack webhooks (Step 5). - Sanitization: PR titles and review states are interpolated directly into Slack notification payloads without explicit escaping or validation steps.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references several external GitHub Actions for CI/CD automation.
- The workflow examples include
actions/checkout@v4,actions/github-script@v7, andslackapi/slack-github-action@v1.27.1, all of which originate from well-known and reputable organizations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes instructions to programmatically alter repository security configurations.
- Step 6 provides a shell script that uses the GitHub CLI (
gh api) to update branch protection rules, requiring specific status checks and enabling administrator enforcement.
Audit Metadata