coreweave-deploy-integration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read and process output from
kubectl,helm, andkustomizecommands, as well as the results of health check requests from inference services (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded commands when the agent evaluates tool outputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill configuration allows the agent to execute shell commands via
kubectl,helm, andkustomize, which can be used to modify cluster state (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The instructions do not include steps to sanitize or validate external output before it is processed by the LLM.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: A TypeScript example provided in the documentation uses synchronous shell execution to retrieve system information.
- Evidence: The health check endpoint example uses
execSyncto run thenvidia-smicommand to query GPU status. - Context: While the command is hardcoded and used for monitoring, the pattern involves spawning a subprocess which is a form of dynamic execution.
Audit Metadata