cursor-sso-integration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions require the agent to handle and process identity provider (IdP) metadata XML files. This creates a potential surface where malicious instructions could be embedded within the metadata file to influence the agent's actions.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read and upload IdP metadata XML files as part of the configuration process (detailed in
SKILL.mdandreferences/saml-2.0-configuration.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or clear separation markers to prevent the agent from interpreting content within the XML files as instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted
Read,Write,Edit, andBash(cmd:*)capabilities in the YAML frontmatter, providing a broad range of actions if the agent were to be successfully influenced by injected content. - Sanitization: There are no explicit validation or sanitization steps mentioned for the contents of the externally provided metadata files.
Audit Metadata