figma-upgrade-migration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data by auditing local codebase files for specific Figma API patterns, which represents an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: The skill performs file reading operations (via
grepandReadtools) on user-controlled source files in directories likesrc/to identify API endpoints and scopes. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or use "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when the agent processes the audited file content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to sensitive capabilities including file writing (
Write,Edit), network operations (curl,fetch), and shell execution (Bash). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the content extracted from local files is performed before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands to audit the codebase and interact with APIs.
- Evidence: Extensive use of
grepfor pattern matching inSKILL.mdandreferences/scope-migration-files-read-deprecation.md. It also providescurlcommands for webhook registration. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to external resources, specifically the Figma REST API.
- Evidence: Use of
fetchandcurlto interact withhttps://api.figma.comfor tasks such as creating webhooks, listing existing webhooks, and checking token health. These requests target a well-known service domain.
Audit Metadata