granola-webhooks-events
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'Examples' section at the end of
SKILL.mdcontains instructions for the agent to record specific metadata (origin=approved,signature=pass) and suppress data retention when encountering a syntheticmeeting.completedevent. This is a behavioral override attempt using authoritative markers commonly used in jailbreak or bypass techniques. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and parse untrusted data from meeting summaries and attendee lists.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context via the
note_contentandattendeesfields of the webhook payload, as described inSKILL.mdStep 2 andreferences/implementation.md. - Boundary markers: None. The skill lacks delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the raw meeting text it processes.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment permits
curl,node, andpython3(listed inallowed-tools), allowing logic derived from untrusted note content to potentially drive shell execution or network requests. - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping logic is provided for the
note_contentfield before it is used for filtering or processing in the Express.js or Python snippets.
Audit Metadata