skills/jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace/snowflake-native-app-release-sheriff/Gen Agent Trust Hub
snowflake-native-app-release-sheriff
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
collect_snowflake_evidence.pyscript usessubprocess.runto call the Snowflake CLI (snow). This is a legitimate requirement for collecting provider evidence. The implementation follows security best practices by passing arguments as a list (avoiding shell injection) and validating all user-supplied inputs, such as the connection profile name, against restrictive regular expressions. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
collect_snowflake_evidence.pyscript dynamically renders SQL templates by substituting placeholders with validated identifiers. To mitigate risk, the script passes the rendered SQL through a validation function that blocks dangerous mutation keywords (e.g.,GRANT,DROP,ALTER) and ensures all statements start with safe keywords likeSELECTorSHOW. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external provider-side metadata which could theoretically contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: The
analyze_native_app_release.pyscript ingests JSON evidence packets provided as local files. - Boundary markers: The system uses a strict evidence contract and enforces independent SHA256 hashes for the bundle, manifest, setup scripts, and cohorts to ensure data integrity.
- Capability inventory: The analysis script itself is strictly data-driven and lacks shell execution, file-write, or network capabilities. The separate collector script is restricted to Snowflake CLI read operations.
- Sanitization: The collector implements extensive redaction for authorization headers and credentials. The analyzer uses schema-based validation to reject any malformed or unexpected data structures.
Audit Metadata