sprint-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's core execution model relies on parsing user-provided requirement specifications to drive subsequent architectural planning and agent implementation tasks.
- Ingestion points: In Phase 0 (SKILL.md), the orchestrator is instructed to read requirement specifications from
.claude/sprint/[N]/specs.mdand iteration status fromstatus.mdto prepare the execution context. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific boundary delimiters or safety prompts to ensure that the content within the specifications does not override the agent's core workflow instructions.
- Capability inventory: The workflow involves high-privilege capabilities including the dynamic spawning of multiple autonomous sub-agents (
python-dev,nextjs-dev,qa-test-agent), the generation of new source and configuration files (api-contract.md,backend-specs.md), and the cleanup of temporary files (Phase 5). - Sanitization: The skill does not define validation, sanitization, or safety filtering for the content within the
specs.mdorstatus.mdfiles before they are utilized to generate planning documents and agent spawns.
Audit Metadata