skills/jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace/supabase-advanced-troubleshooting/Gen Agent Trust Hub
supabase-advanced-troubleshooting
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill provides instructions for utilizing high-privilege credentials and accessing infrastructure secrets. \n
- Evidence: Mentions and provides code using the
SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEYinSKILL.mdandreferences/lock-connection-diagnostics.md, which bypasses Row Level Security. \n - Evidence:
references/evidence-collection-framework.mdcontains a script that retrieves full Kubernetes secrets viakubectl get secret.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The diagnostic script inreferences/evidence-collection-framework.mdaggregates sensitive information into a bundle. \n - Evidence: The script
advanced-supabase-debug.shcollects unredacted secrets, system logs, and network packet captures (tcpdump). \n - Note: The script saves raw secrets to a file named
secrets-redacted.yaml, which could mislead users into thinking the content is sanitized when it is not.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses potentially dangerous system-level commands for debugging. \n - Evidence: Includes commands for
tcpdump,kubectl, andjournalctlin the evidence collection framework.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data from multiple sources. \n - Ingestion points: Data enters the context from
pg_stat_statementsresults, databaseerror_logstables, and Kubernetes/system logs. \n - Boundary markers: No explicit instructions or markers are used to isolate untrusted data from the agent's control flow. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution, database clients, and network utilities. \n
- Sanitization: The skill does not implement validation or sanitization for the collected logs and query results before processing.
Audit Metadata