vertex-engine-inspector
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/inspect-agent.shuses string interpolation to embed shell arguments (AGENT_ID,PROJECT_ID,REGION) directly into a Python code block executed viapython3 -c. A maliciously crafted argument could break out of the string literal and execute arbitrary Python code within the agent's environment.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of system commands through theBashtool and Python'ssubprocessmodule to query cloud infrastructure. While necessary for its diagnostic purpose, the lack of input sanitization in the associated shell scripts increases the risk of command injection.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and parses metadata from the Vertex AI API (e.g., agent names, display names, and configurations). This creates a surface where malicious instructions embedded in a cloud resource's metadata could influence the agent's behavior during inspection.\n - Ingestion points: Metadata is retrieved via
vertexai.Client().agent_engines.get()inscripts/check-security.pyandscripts/inspect-agent.sh.\n - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions are used to separate API data from agent instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution via
subprocess.runand theBashtool, as well as network access viacurland the Google Cloud SDK.\n - Sanitization: Metadata is processed using
jqandjson.loads, but is not sanitized for potential prompt injection payloads before being presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata