skills/johnlindquist/claude/stuck/Gen Agent Trust Hub

stuck

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines several prompt templates that ingest untrusted content such as code snippets, error logs, and user-provided problem descriptions. This data is interpolated directly into prompts for the Gemini model without explicit sanitization or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Ingestion points: Placeholders for code, error logs, and problem descriptions are present throughout SKILL.md (e.g., [paste code], [describe problem]).
  • Boundary markers: The templates utilize markdown code blocks and structured labels like CODE: and ERROR:, but lack specific instructions to the model to disregard instructions contained within the user-provided data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the gemini CLI for processing these prompts and standard shell commands for project maintenance.
  • Sanitization: No input validation or escaping is applied to the untrusted data before it is sent to the LLM.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute various shell commands for environment verification and troubleshooting, including git bisect, node, npm, and gh. Notably, it includes a command to recursively remove the node_modules directory and package-lock.json file as part of a clean reinstallation process.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The escalation workflow includes the use of npm install, which retrieves and installs third-party software packages from the public NPM registry.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 08:25 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — stuck