skills/kotlin/kotlin-agent-skills/kotlin-tooling-kotlin-toolchain-plugin-authoring/Gen Agent Trust Hub
kotlin-tooling-kotlin-toolchain-plugin-authoring
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents an architecture where local plugins ingest external data to drive build-time tasks, which is a potential surface for indirect instructions to influence agent actions.
- Ingestion points: Plugins ingest data through the
@Configurablesettings interface (populated frommodule.yaml) and viaSystem.getenv()calls within task actions (SKILL.md, references/examples.md). - Boundary markers: The code snippets provided do not use explicit delimiters or "ignore instructions" markers when processing these inputs.
- Capability inventory: Task actions documented in the skill have the capability to write to the filesystem (
writeText), delete directories (deleteRecursively), and interact with the local git repository (GitRepo) (references/examples.md). - Sanitization: The documentation explicitly advises that users should "validate a value before using it in a file path or process argument," but the accompanying code examples do not demonstrate sanitization or validation of the external inputs.
Audit Metadata