image-to-threejs
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
SKILL.mdfile instructs the agent or user to clone a repository from an unverified GitHub organization (img2threejs) to~/.local/share/img2threejsas a prerequisite. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill executes Python scripts directly from the cloned external repository (e.g.,
run forge/stage1_intake/probe_image.py), which constitutes the execution of remote code after download. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]:
scripts/render_model.pygenerates large blocks of JavaScript at runtime (MAIN_TSandSHOOT_JS) and executes them vianode -e. Additionally,scripts/align_framing.pyusessys.path.insertto dynamically include the external repository's path for importing modules. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of
subprocess.Popenandsubprocess.runto call external tools includingnpx vite,node,git clone, and various Python helper scripts. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted image data which is used to influence the 3D generation process while the agent has access to powerful shell capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Reference images (.jpg, .png) processed by the intake gate.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution, network access (via
git), and file system writes. - Boundary markers: None present.
- Sanitization: No sanitization of image content or metadata is performed.
Audit Metadata