threejs-game-director
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes a shell script (
scripts/probe_asset_credentials.sh) that accesses and sources sensitive shell configuration files, including~/.bashrc,~/.zshrc,~/.bash_profile, and~/.zprofile. Access to these files is categorized as sensitive file exposure.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Instructions inSKILL.mdmandate that the agent execute a credential probe and include the output (revealing the presence or absence of environment variables likeTRIPO_API_KEY,GEMINI_API_KEY, andELEVENLABS_API_KEY) in its final report, exposing environmental metadata to the agent's output.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to orchestrate the execution of multiple local scripts, including Bash shell scripts, Python scripts, and Node.js utilities (e.g.,audit_reference_report.pyandprobe_asset_credentials.sh) across the skill and its required siblings.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection by actively searching for and loading instructions from multiple externalSKILL.mdand reference files across various filesystem paths (e.g.,~/.claude/skills/,~/.agents/skills/).\n - Ingestion points: Sibling
SKILL.mdfiles and reference markdown files loaded from various relative and absolute system paths.\n - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used when loading these external files.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell scripts, Python code, and Node.js scripts.\n
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the content of the loaded files is performed before they are integrated into the agent's context.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata