nano-banana
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the setup of an MCP server by downloading the
nanobanana-mcpornano-banana-mcppackages directly from the npm registry. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
npxutility to dynamically download and execute external code on the host machine. This is used to run the MCP server that interfaces with Google's Gemini models. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides specific shell command templates for using
magick(ImageMagick) to perform image compositing and branding operations on local files. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user prompts and editing instructions as part of its core image generation and modification workflow, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
promptparameter ingemini_generate_imageand theinstructionsparameter ingemini_edit_imageandcontinue_editing. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or specific instructions provided to the agent to treat the user-supplied content as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands via
npxandmagick, and it writes generated files to the~/Documents/nanobanana_generated/directory. - Sanitization: No input validation or sanitization is performed on the prompt or instruction strings before they are passed to the underlying image generation tools.
Audit Metadata