skills/lvtd-llc/skills/pdf/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pdf

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 21, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instruction set includes the use of sudo apt-get install to set up system dependencies, which grants root-level access during the installation process.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a shell command pdftoppm -png $INPUT_PDF $OUTPUT_PREFIX for rendering. The interpolation of $INPUT_PDF and $OUTPUT_PREFIX variables into a shell string poses a risk of command injection if the agent processes files with malicious names (e.g., using shell metacharacters).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the installation of Python libraries (reportlab, pdfplumber, pypdf) and system utilities (poppler-utils) from well-known package registries to handle its primary functions.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external PDF documents, which are untrusted data sources that could contain instructions intended to manipulate the agent's logic.
  • Ingestion points: PDF files read for content extraction and visual review (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to ignore or delimit embedded text within the PDFs.
  • Capability inventory: Shell command execution (pdftoppm), file system writes to tmp/ and output/ paths, and dependency installation commands (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization of PDF content or file metadata is mentioned before processing or rendering.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jun 21, 2026, 03:23 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pdf