Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 21, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instruction set includes the use of
sudo apt-get installto set up system dependencies, which grants root-level access during the installation process. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a shell command
pdftoppm -png $INPUT_PDF $OUTPUT_PREFIXfor rendering. The interpolation of$INPUT_PDFand$OUTPUT_PREFIXvariables into a shell string poses a risk of command injection if the agent processes files with malicious names (e.g., using shell metacharacters). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the installation of Python libraries (
reportlab,pdfplumber,pypdf) and system utilities (poppler-utils) from well-known package registries to handle its primary functions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external PDF documents, which are untrusted data sources that could contain instructions intended to manipulate the agent's logic.
- Ingestion points: PDF files read for content extraction and visual review (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to ignore or delimit embedded text within the PDFs.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution (
pdftoppm), file system writes totmp/andoutput/paths, and dependency installation commands (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization of PDF content or file metadata is mentioned before processing or rendering.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata