ecommerce-store-prospecting

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to fetch and process content from external, untrusted ecommerce websites using curl. This data ingestion creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded in a target website could attempt to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: curl commands targeting external domains (e.g., https://store.com) in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent from the provided command examples.
  • Capability inventory: Network access via curl and text processing via grep.
  • Sanitization: None specified for the fetched HTML content.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains several examples of shell commands intended to be executed by the agent to identify store platforms and catalogue sizes.
  • Evidence: The automated alert flagging 'Remote code piped to Sh' is a false positive. The command curl -s https://store.com | grep -ioE 'cdn\.shopify\.com|Shopify\.theme|shopify-features' pipes data to grep for pattern identification. The scanner likely misidentified the string Shopify as a pipe to a shell (| Sh).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the fetching of data from external domains via curl. These operations are consistent with the skill's primary purpose of ecommerce prospecting and research.
  • Evidence: Examples include fetching store homepages and sitemap XML files (e.g., sitemap_products_1.xml) to estimate catalogue size.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://store.com - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 7, 2026, 06:34 PM