ecommerce-store-prospecting
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to fetch and process content from external, untrusted ecommerce websites using
curl. This data ingestion creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded in a target website could attempt to influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points:
curlcommands targeting external domains (e.g.,https://store.com) inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent from the provided command examples.
- Capability inventory: Network access via
curland text processing viagrep. - Sanitization: None specified for the fetched HTML content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains several examples of shell commands intended to be executed by the agent to identify store platforms and catalogue sizes.
- Evidence: The automated alert flagging 'Remote code piped to Sh' is a false positive. The command
curl -s https://store.com | grep -ioE 'cdn\.shopify\.com|Shopify\.theme|shopify-features'pipes data togrepfor pattern identification. The scanner likely misidentified the stringShopifyas a pipe to a shell (| Sh). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the fetching of data from external domains via
curl. These operations are consistent with the skill's primary purpose of ecommerce prospecting and research. - Evidence: Examples include fetching store homepages and sitemap XML files (e.g.,
sitemap_products_1.xml) to estimate catalogue size.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://store.com - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata