skillfinder-external-scout
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to fetch and process content from untrusted external skill registries and GitHub repositories.
- Ingestion points: External
SKILL.mdfiles, repository descriptions, and metadata are ingested into the agent's context during the discovery and inspection phases inSKILL.mdandreferences/upstream-skill.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit structural delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched external content, increasing the risk that a malicious skill could hijack the agent's session.
- Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to read the full body of top candidates to analyze their scripts, hooks, and permissions, which provides a direct vector for instructions within those files to execute via the agent's reasoning.
- Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization, filtering, or validation of the external markdown content before it is processed.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local shell commands to execute
python scripts/search.pyfor performing semantic searches against a local or remote index. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fallback logic involves performing web and GitHub searches to discover and fetch code (skills) from unknown third-party authors and registries when local discovery fails.
Audit Metadata