skillfinder-external-scout

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to fetch and process content from untrusted external skill registries and GitHub repositories.
  • Ingestion points: External SKILL.md files, repository descriptions, and metadata are ingested into the agent's context during the discovery and inspection phases in SKILL.md and references/upstream-skill.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit structural delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched external content, increasing the risk that a malicious skill could hijack the agent's session.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to read the full body of top candidates to analyze their scripts, hooks, and permissions, which provides a direct vector for instructions within those files to execute via the agent's reasoning.
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization, filtering, or validation of the external markdown content before it is processed.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local shell commands to execute python scripts/search.py for performing semantic searches against a local or remote index.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fallback logic involves performing web and GitHub searches to discover and fetch code (skills) from unknown third-party authors and registries when local discovery fails.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 24, 2026, 04:13 PM