setup-celltypist-remote-tool
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to install a Python wheel directly from a remote URL (
https://connect.aiscientist.tools/downloads/tuplatform_connect-0.3.0-py3-none-any.whl). Although the download is pinned with a SHA-256 hash, the hosting domain is not part of the recognized trusted organizations or well-known services. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The workflow requires downloading and converting a model in the
pickleformat (Immune_All_Low.pkl). While the skill provides instructions for isolation and conversion to a safernpzformat, the requirement to handle and process serialized Python objects presents a security risk due to the potential for arbitrary code execution during deserialization. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
run_celltypist_annotatetool processes external H5AD files provided via theadata_pathparameter, which serves as an ingestion point for untrusted data. - Ingestion points: The
adata_pathargument in therun_celltypist_annotateexample (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or validation logic for the contents of the biological data files are mentioned.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment has the capability to execute shell commands, perform local file writes to runtime directories, and interact with the ToolUniverse platform over the network (SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or structural validation performed on the H5AD data before it is processed by the annotation tool.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The setup process involves executing multiple shell commands, including environment creation, dependency installation, and running conversion scripts. This provides an execution surface that relies on the integrity of the downloaded resources and local script implementations.
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