joplin-publisher
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.run()to interface with the Joplin CLI. While it uses the safer list-based argument format, user-supplied inputs such asnotebooknames and notetitlesare passed directly as arguments. This could lead to argument injection if a user provides strings starting with dashes (e.g.,--some-flag) or other control characters that the Joplin CLI might interpret as commands rather than data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary purpose is to import external markdown documents and mermaid diagrams, which often originate from untrusted sources (web searches, user uploads). There is a risk that these documents contain malicious instructions intended to manipulate the agent during the publishing process.
- Ingestion points: The
publish_to_joplinandbatch_importfunctions ingest notecontent,title, andtagsfrom external inputs. - Boundary markers: None are implemented; the content is processed directly into Joplin notes.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write temporary files, execute local CLI commands via subprocess, and make network requests via the Joplin API.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation for the content or titles before they are processed by the tool chain.
Audit Metadata