snowflake-snowpark-dbt

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The example provided for creating a Vectorized UDF utilizes pickle.load() to deserialize a model file at runtime.
  • Evidence (SKILL.md): model = pickle.load(open(sys.path[0] + "/model.pkl", "rb"))
  • The pickle module is well-known for being vulnerable to arbitrary code execution during deserialization. While the provided example references a local file (model.pkl), this implementation pattern is considered a security risk if the provenance of the file cannot be strictly verified or if the execution environment allows for file tampering.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes a data transformation workflow that ingests data from external Snowflake tables, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if the processed data contains instructions intended for an agent.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads data from Snowflake tables using session.table("customers") and dbt source/reference macros like {{ ref('stg_orders') }}.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not describe or implement delimiters, tagging, or specific instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the retrieved data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes powerful data manipulation capabilities, including row-wise UDFs, vectorized pandas UDFs, and stored procedures that can write data back to the database via save_as_table.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the data content to prevent embedded instructions from influencing downstream agent behavior or logic execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 10, 2026, 08:16 PM