unslop-file
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied text files through an LLM to humanize them, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: User-provided files read via
scripts/cli.pyand processed inscripts/humanize.py. - Boundary markers: The LLM prompt in
scripts/humanize.pyincludes a 'STRICT RULES' section instructing the model to preserve code blocks, URLs, and technical terms exactly. - Capability inventory: The skill can read and overwrite local files, make network requests to the Anthropic API, and execute the
claudeCLI via subprocess. - Sanitization: The
detect.pyscript checks for sensitive file paths and content (API keys, private keys) and refuses to process them in LLM mode. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill optionally downloads machine learning models from HuggingFace for text detection and surprisal analysis.
- Evidence:
scripts/fetch_detectors.pyandscripts/detector.pyusehuggingface_hubandtransformersto download models likeOxidane/tmr-ai-text-detectoranddesklib/ai-text-detector-v1.01. - Context: These downloads target a well-known service (HuggingFace) and are opt-in features.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a subprocess to invoke the
claudeCLI as a fallback for LLM processing. - Evidence:
scripts/humanize.pycontainssubprocess.run(["claude", "--print"], ...). - Context: The command uses a fixed argument list and passes user data safely via stdin, preventing shell injection.
Audit Metadata