agent-loop-engine
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of
child_process.execSyncacross multiple components, includingship-change.js,hooks/pre_completion_hook.cjs,hooks/post_tool_edit_hook.cjs, and the PI extension TypeScript file. These scripts execute shell commands (e.g.,pytest,npm test) often derived from external parameters or project discovery logic. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
hooks/session-startscript implements a context injection mechanism that wraps the entireSKILL.mdcontent in<EXTREMELY_IMPORTANT>tags. This is designed to force the loop framework's logic into the agent's primary context, which is a technique often associated with instruction override attempts. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: An indirect prompt injection surface is present where untrusted data from user requirements could influence the shell commands executed by verification hooks. Ingestion points: User requirements in
roles/grill-me.mdand task descriptions inroles/implementer.md. Boundary markers:<EXTREMELY_IMPORTANT>tags used in session startup. Capability inventory: Broad shell execution viaexecSyncin various utility and hook scripts. Sanitization: No explicit validation or escaping of thetest_commandparameter before execution.
Audit Metadata