codex-discuss
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to build and execute shell commands using variables that can be influenced by user input, specifically the
<model>,<effort>, and<SESSION_ID>parameters. If the agent fails to strictly validate or sanitize these values before constructing the command string, it could be vulnerable to command injection attacks. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a workflow that inlines untrusted user content (plans, drafts, ideas) directly into the prompt sent to the Codex CLI. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions hidden in the discussed content could override the Codex agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The user's trigger message and any files referenced by path in the conversation.
- Boundary markers: The skill uses markdown headers to separate sections in the prompt but lacks explicit delimiters or instructions for the Codex model to ignore embedded commands within the user content.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell execution via the
codex execandcodex exec resumecommands. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the inlined user content is specified in the instructions.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill is designed to read the user's local configuration at
~/.codex/config.tomland manage session data in~/.codex/sessions/. While this is part of the tool's intended orchestration, it involves the handling of potentially sensitive local system paths.
Audit Metadata