skills/mryll/skills/codex-discuss/Gen Agent Trust Hub

codex-discuss

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to build and execute shell commands using variables that can be influenced by user input, specifically the <model>, <effort>, and <SESSION_ID> parameters. If the agent fails to strictly validate or sanitize these values before constructing the command string, it could be vulnerable to command injection attacks.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a workflow that inlines untrusted user content (plans, drafts, ideas) directly into the prompt sent to the Codex CLI. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions hidden in the discussed content could override the Codex agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: The user's trigger message and any files referenced by path in the conversation.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses markdown headers to separate sections in the prompt but lacks explicit delimiters or instructions for the Codex model to ignore embedded commands within the user content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell execution via the codex exec and codex exec resume commands.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the inlined user content is specified in the instructions.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill is designed to read the user's local configuration at ~/.codex/config.toml and manage session data in ~/.codex/sessions/. While this is part of the tool's intended orchestration, it involves the handling of potentially sensitive local system paths.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 20, 2026, 10:38 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — codex-discuss