voice-clone-tts
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches AI model weights from Hugging Face and installs necessary Python modules from GitHub. All external references are pinned to specific versions to prevent supply chain attacks.
- Evidence:
scripts/setup.pyandscripts/providers.pypin Hugging Face repositories (e.g.,OpenMOSS-Team/MOSS-TTS-Nano-100M-ONNX,Qwen/Qwen3-TTS) to specific revisions and installmoss-tts-nanofrom GitHub using a fixed commit hash (8b7bcc9). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Subprocess calls are used to interface with legitimate system utilities for audio processing and environment configuration.
- Evidence:
scripts/build.pyandscripts/common.pyutilizeffmpegfor audio assembly and normalization;scripts/clone-minimax.pyusesffprobefor audio duration checks;scripts/setup.pyusesuvfor virtual environment management;scripts/providers.pyinvokes themmxCLI for cloud synthesis tasks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external text files (
script.md) and audio recordings. It maintains security by avoiding shell interpolation and using structured arguments for all subprocess calls. - Ingestion points: User-provided scripts and reference audio recordings entered via command-line arguments.
- Boundary markers: Text is segmented into discrete chapters and sentences before being passed to synthesis engines.
- Capability inventory: The skill is restricted to file operations within its output directory and network requests to established TTS providers (MiniMax, Hugging Face).
- Sanitization: Employs
subprocess.runwith list-based arguments to prevent command injection from user-provided text strings.
Audit Metadata