hive-mind-advanced
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of the
claude-flowCLI tool vianpxfor core functionalities, including initializing the collective memory system, spawning worker agents, and monitoring performance metrics. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The use of
npximplies the potential download and execution of theclaude-flowpackage from the public npm registry during initialization or execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a system where a 'Queen' agent orchestrates tasks based on user-provided objectives. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if malicious instructions are embedded in the task objectives or memory entries that the agents process.
- Ingestion points: Objective strings provided to the
spawncommand and data stored within theCollectiveMemorysystem (e.g., knowledge, task, and result types). - Boundary markers: The provided documentation does not define specific delimiters or instructions to treat objective inputs as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The system has the capability to spawn new processes (worker agents), perform file system writes (SQLite database for memory), and integrate with external services like GitHub for repository analysis.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence in the instructions of input validation, escaping, or sanitization for the objectives passed to the agents.
Audit Metadata