sequence-performance
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data by reading the full body of email replies received through outreach platforms or CSV imports.
- Ingestion points: The
reply_textfield within thecampaign_datastructure inSKILL.md(Step 1 and Step 3). - Boundary markers: The instructions in Step 3 (Reply Analysis) do not specify the use of protective delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the email reply content, allowing potential malicious instructions to be processed by the LLM.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses
data-analysisandreportingcapabilities and is designed to pass its findings toemail-draftingandcold-email-outreachskills, meaning an injection could influence downstream automated actions. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the external reply content is described before it is analyzed for classification and objection patterns.
Audit Metadata